Joint decision to allow more time for the search for a common agreement The text of the Framework Cooperation Agreement (GFA) defines the principles, rights and obligations for the cooperative management and development of water resources in the Nile basin. Instead of quantifying ”equitable rights” or allocations of water use, the Treaty intends to establish a framework to ”promote the integrated management, sustainable development and harmonious use of water resources in the river basin, as well as their conservation and protection for the benefit of present and future generations”. To this end, the treaty provides for the establishment of a permanent institutional mechanism, the Nile Basin Commission (CBRN). The Commission would serve to promote and facilitate the implementation of the CFA and to facilitate cooperation among Nile Basin States in the conservation, management and development of the Nile Basin and its waters. Nearly two decades after its creation, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) Transition Mechanism has been credited with fulfilling several components of its institutional commitment – building an atmosphere of trust and dialogue among riparian states. However, negotiations under the auspices of the NBI have failed to accomplish one of the organization`s most fundamental tasks: the creation of a permanent legal framework and an institution that is ”acceptable” to all States in the basin. The diplomatic effort that led to the adoption of the Nile Basin Cooperation Framework (CFA) Agreement was fraught with pitfalls. I argue that despite the unprecedented summits of cooperative dialogues, which have been widely portrayed as a ”political triumph” from an upstream perspective, the legal and hydropolitical discourse that led to the final formulation of the CFA did not meet the ”expectations” of two major states at stake: Egypt and Sudan. It was an existential threat to the institutional future of the BNI itself and the noble goals it sought to achieve. Nevertheless, the organizational urgency in the basin has also shown that nile-bordering states have little choice but to revive the ”waning” momentum and ensure that the NBI enterprise is completed in an ”inclusive” and ”fair” manner.

Otherwise, according to the author, the alternative would not only represent a bleak future from the point of view of cooperation and optimal development of the Nile`s resources in the long term, but would also stifle the sustainable river interests of the basin states. Part V describes the dispute resolution procedures that may arise from the implementation and enforcement of the contract. It also provides for the creation of bilateral or plurilateral instruments (agreements) that would complement the CFA. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is a partnership between nile-bordering states that ”aims to develop the river cooperatively, share important socio-economic benefits, and promote regional peace and security.” [1] The BNI initiated a dialogue among riparian states, which led to a common vision goal of ”achieving sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable use and benefits of shared water resources in the Nile Basin”. [1] [2] It was officially launched in February 1999[2] by the water ministers of nine countries that share the river: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Eritrea as observers. From the outset, the Nile Basin Initiative has been supported by the World Bank and other external partners. The World Bank`s mandate is to support the work of the NBI as the lead development partner and as the manager of the Nile Basin Multi-Donor Trust Fund. [3] One of the partners is the Nile Basin Discourse, which describes itself as ”a civil society network of organizations that have a positive impact on the development of projects and programs under the Nile Basin Initiative.” [4] The signing of the agreement was already scheduled at a ministerial meeting in 2007, but was postponed at Egypt`s request.

[21] At a new ministerial meeting in Kinshasa in May 2009, the upstream countries decided to sign the agreement without all countries signing at the same time. However, the signing was delayed and at the next meeting of ministers in Sharm el-Sheikh in April 2010, Egypt again requested to postpone the signing. In particular, the article on water security (Article 14 ter) raised objections from Egypt and the Sudan. .